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ABSTRACT: This paper synthesises recent research on the dynamic between 
religion and right wing populism (RWP) in Poland by investigating their 
interplay across four socio-political fields: immigrant and refugee reception, 
conditions for religious minorities (Antisemitism and Islamophobia), gender 
relations and LGBT rights. It focuses on the roles of both discursive religion 
(public discourses which use and are shaped by religion) and of institutional 
religion, especially the Polish Catholic Church (PCC), while acknowledging 
other factors shaping the electoral success of the Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (Law 
and Justice) party, which has enabled a RWP agenda to be implemented 
by government. Such factors include the role of media (especially some 
Catholic media), social media, and welfare policy. It argues that where 
official Catholic teaching clearly opposes RWP stances (e.g. on refugees and 
interfaith relations) the leadership of the PCC has attempted to restrain RWP 
mobilisation. However, where official teaching aligns more closely with 
RWP ideology (e.g. on gender and sexuality) opposition has been largely 
limited to liberal minorities within the church. It concludes by surveying the 
developing collaboration of opposition movements.
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1. Introduction: Responses to the Refugee Crisis and Immigration
Closing doors is not the solution... We all have the duty of welcoming our brother who flees from 
war, hunger, or violence. (Pope Francis, 2016)
A good Christian is one who helps, [but] not necessarily by accepting refugees. (Elżbieta Witek, 
PiS spokesperson, quoted in Cienski 2017)
Migrations are dynamic, common and – as the history of the world shows – unavoidable, but in 
the context of socio-demographic situation in our country they are even beneficial. Large Polish 
cities for years have been open to migration processes and diversity of inhabitants. …It is in our 
common, broadly understood interest that migrations are managed responsibly and safely at the 
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local level so that we create socially coherent cities, minimizing the threats related to ghettoization, 
separation, poverty and exclusion of new inhabitants. (Declaration of Mayors on the Cooperation 
of the Union of Polish Metropolises Concerning Migration, in Szpak 2019: 1165)
These quotations suggest something of the diversity of opinion in Poland concerning the 
2015-16 refugee ‘crisis’ and immigration more broadly, and of the roles and uses of religion 
in Polish political discourse. While Pope Francis’ statement has been echoed by official Polish 
Catholic sources (Narkowicz 2018: 361), the current government has interpreted Christian 
teaching rather differently, as their spokesperson’s comment suggests. Polish government 
discourse also contrasts with the approach of city authorities faced with the practical challenges 
of dealing with modest (in comparative European terms) but increasing immigration (second 
and third quotations). For while the PiS (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, Law and Justice Party) 
government (2015-) is rhetorically hostile to most forms of immigration, it has failed to produce 
national policies to deal with its practical challenges, so as immigrant numbers have grown 
during its period in office, the burden of response has fallen to cities:
In October 2018 the number of migrants who were granted the right of residence in Poland 
reached about 360,000… in October 2017 it was about 30,800 and 23,700 in 2016. (migracje.gov.
pl.en quoted in Szpak 2019: 1061) 
In response to the ‘refugee crisis’ of 2015-16 the Polish Catholic Church (PCC)’s official 
leadership, the Bishops’ Conference, followed the papal call by issuing ‘several statements 
calling for assistance to churches in the Middle East … [and] to refugees from Iraq and 
Syria’ (Pędziwiatr 2018: 466). In the build up to World Youth Day in 2016 they followed this 
up with a practical policy suggestion to introduce Italian style ‘humanitarian corridors’ to 
allow refugees safe passage to countries further north and west with more resources to help 
refugees; however, ‘after the refusal of the government to relocate any refugees to Poland, 
and numerous Islamophobic statements by members of the government, the initiative was 
abandoned at the end of 2016.’ (ibid., 467). As we shall see further below in the section on 
Antisemitism and Islamophobia, these official responses are in line with theological teaching 
in the Catholic Church since the Second Vatican Council, both on humanitarianism and 
interfaith dialogue. But in the Polish public sphere they have tended to get shouted down by 
more strident voices drawing on a xenophobic Catholic nationalism:
Some Catholic media outlets … associated with the conservative wing of the Church — such as 
the website Fronda.pl and the bimonthly glossy magazine Polonia Christiana, online at PCh24.pl 
— have significantly contributed to stereotypical portraits of refugees, Arabs and Muslims. They 
have served as important ‘thickening agents’ of the thin populist ideology that considers society 
to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic camps … and politics to be the 
expression of the ‘general will’ of the people. (ibid. 468).
Immigration is just one social field affected by right-wing populism in Poland. Other 
areas include religious minority rights, women’s rights - especially reproductive rights – and 
LGBT rights. Furthermore, under the PiS government the independence of public service 
broadcasting, the judiciary and the civil service have been challenged by legislative changes 
introduced as part of a concerted effort to change the composition of key national institutions 
viewed as ‘too liberal’ (Marcinkiewicz 2016: 474). 
As with immigration, the response and role of the Christian population and institutions 
across these social fields is complex – 90% of the Polish population may identify as Catholic, 
but the church does not speak with one voice. Drawing on recent research, this paper will 
survey the impact of right wing populism across these fields, investigating the causes of 
right wing populist influence, examining the extent to which religion is mobilised both as 
a discursive resource in its support (‘discursive religion’, Herbert 2003: 24-7) in the public 
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sphere, not under the control of PCC, and as ‘institutional religion’ (ibid.) – the PCC and other 
religious actors. The central research questions addressed are:
1. What is the influence and effect of right wing populism across key social fields in Polish 
society, including the rights and lives of religious minorities (Muslim and Jewish), gender 
relations (especially gender equality initiatives and reproductive rights), and LGBT groups? 
2. What is the role of religion in the mobilisation of right wing populism? 
3. What has caused the increase in RWP influence across these social fields in Poland?
4. How have opposition groups responded, and what are the prospects for change?
2. Historical Context from Partition to PiS: Catholicism, National 
Identity and Populist Radical Right Mobilisation in Poland
The European Social Survey (ESS, 2016) shows that in a continent where a majority amongst 
young people (aged 16-29) in many countries say they have no religion (e.g. the UK and the 
Netherlands in Western Europe, and Poland’s neighbours, the Czech Republic and the Eastern 
provinces of Germany), fully 84% of Polish young people identify as religious. Furthermore, as 
Bullivant (2018) notes, not only does Poland ‘have a very high proportion of Catholic affiliates, 
but they exhibit remarkably high levels of actual practice: almost half attend Mass at least 
weekly, and only 3% never attend’. Thus, regular Catholic ritual practice remains a strong 
aspect of shared social life in Poland. This strength of support for Catholic rituals, and the 
communal power of religion it attests to and reinforces, needs to be understood in the context 
of a distinctive national history. 
Partitioned between Russia, the Austro-Hungarian Empire and Prussia for the long 
nineteenth century (1772-1918), the Polish language and Catholic Church (PCC) became the 
twin pillars of national identity. Occupied by Nazi Germany (1939-1945), Poland emerged 
devastated from World War II, shorn of its religious diversity (Jews lost to the Holocaust and 
emigration, German Lutherans fled West ahead of the Red Army) and with a Communist regime 
under Soviet influence which suppressed Polish hopes for sovereignty. In this context with a 
96% Catholic population and political dissent stifled, the PCC became both the institutional 
and symbolic centre of independent Polish national identity. 
An illustrative case is the commemoration of the millennium of Polish nationhood in 1966. 
While the state celebrated by portraying the communist system as ‘the crown of the road 
traversed by the Polish nation through history towards freedom and progress’ (President 
Gomułka, in Kubik 1994: 112), the PCC launched a decade long tour (1956-66) to all Polish 
parishes of the national icon the black Madonna of Częstochowa, a move which precipitated 
a ‘massive returns to the sacramental life’ (ibid,) which ‘defined the cultural conflict between 
church and state for decades to come’ (ibid.:111). This cultural frame was tapped into by 
the Solidarity independent union movement, as it began its nine-year struggle for Polish 
independence: 
The initial public presentation of Solidarity in the Gdansk shipyards in August 1980 – with its 
crosses, flowers, religious pictures, Masses – [was] instantly comprehensible to a mass public. 
Such a religious/historical format … enhanced Solidarity’s potential for mass mobilisation. (Osa 
1997: 352) 
 The idea of Poland, sustained by the church, standing alone abandoned by allies and 
occupied and divided by enemies is thus one with strong historical resonance, and provides 
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an interpretative frame which, while not exclusive to the populist right, has been powerfully 
mobilised by it, and especially by the PiS. 
On the side of the PCC, its role as the symbolic dynamo of opposition placed it in a powerful 
position to shape the post-Communist settlement in 1989. But a role which had proved 
effective in opposition was arguably less suited to functioning in a democracy, especially the 
liberal form of democracy defined by the protection of individual minority rights. For the 
PCC used its powerful position and popular support to embed itself in state institutions such 
as education (especially religious education), and to push through legal change (including 
increasing restrictions on abortion), against majority public opinion. In the early 1990s this led 
to clashes with the Ombudsman for Citizen’s rights, who repeatedly warned of the emergence 
of ‘denominational’ or ‘parachurch’ state in Poland, for example:
The church is actually interfering with all three spheres of power: legal, executive and court. I am 
afraid that we are standing at the gateway of a denominational state (1993 in Pawlik 1995: 34) 
Commenting on these developments Krzemiński argues:
The Church … very quickly began to define sharply its moral and political message, ceasing to 
be an open space for people with different, sometimes contradictory attitudes … the Church very 
quickly … undermine[d] its undoubted accomplishments in favour of trying to secure political 
influence in the new state (2018: 87) 
The 1990s also saw the re-emergence of forms Polish nationalism which reached back to 
Poland’s pre-communist history, for example influenced by the ideas of Roman Dmowski, 
in which the Church and nation are seen as inextricably intertwined to the exclusion of 
others viewed as intrinsically untrustworthy and treacherous, including Jews, foreigners and 
liberals (ibid. 95). In this discourse is found the characteristic polarizing rhetoric of populist 
mobilization – the people, perceived as organically united and of one will, in this case bound 
by Church and nation, against the others – liberal ‘elites’ and the media, foreigners, other 
religions and minorities. As we shall see, this discourse fits the classic definition of radical 
right populism as defined by Mudde, which holds that:
[S]tates should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native group (‘the nation’) and that 
non-native elements (persons and ideas) are fundamentally threatening to the homogenous 
nation-state (Mudde, 2007: 19)
3. Factors Empowering the PiS; Radio Marjya, Social Media, Welfare 
Policy and Religious Voters
A key disseminator of the populist and ultra-nationalist discourse which emerged in the 
1990s has been the Radio Marjya (RM) media group which, across multiple platforms, has pushed 
for an exclusivist Polish nationalism rooted in popular Catholicism. Led by a Redemptorist 
monk, Father Tadeusz Rydzyk, the ‘father-director’, the radio station Radio Marjya (founded 
1994) has contributed to religious nationalism becoming part of the dominant media frame. 
By 2007: 
The media outlets constituting the Radio Maryja Group … include[d] a daily newspaper (Nasz 
Dziennik, ‘Our Daily’), a TV station (TV Trwam), a private university in Toruń (‘Wyższa Szkoła 
Kultury Społecznej i Medialnej’, College of Social and Media Culture), a charitable foundation 
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(Lux Veritatis), a museum and an array of other projects–all with a strongly nationalist-Catholic 
profile, often in conflict with the PCC’s official position (Fras 2007: 34)
The RM group has played a key role in propagating and maintaining a populist, socially 
conservative discourse in Poland, especially the field of gender relations and female autonomy:
Promoting itself as ‘the Catholic voice in your home’, … Radio Maryja … skilfully utilizes the 
new technologies and tools of the open market to revive the socialist cult of leadership and to 
mobilize paternalistic ideology in order to convey hegemonic teachings about the meanings of 
family, gender roles, sanctioned heteronormativity and proper marital procreativity (Marcianak 
2009: 173)
Rydzyk actively participated in the creation of an ultra-nationalist political party, the League 
of Polish Families in 1999, and later switched his allegiance to the more electorally successful 
PiS, which led the ruling coalition from 2005-7 and has formed a majority government in 
Poland since 2015. While its listeners have often been dismissed as ignorant, rural and elderly 
by critics, and Rydzyk ridiculed, Radio Maryja (RM)’s audience share has at times reached a 
significant proportion of the population – for example, the Polish Statistical Institute estimates 
and increase from 4% to 15% in the years 2008 to 2011 (CBOS 2011), although this had dropped 
to 1.9% again by 2015 (Krzemiński 2018: 99). 
But, as Krzemiński argues, the RM group’s main influence does reside in its share of radio 
audience, but rather in its role in the dissemination of an ultra-nationalist outlook through its 
multiple organs, from local support groups to educational and media institutions, and in the 
number of bishops supportive of the movement, despite opposition from others:
The real significance of RM does not consist in the number of listeners it has … [but rather in] the 
acceptance and support of Polish Bishops for the views expressed by RM, and with the political 
role of the radio station as well as Fr. Rydzyk’s entire media conglomerate. (ibid. 100) 
It is important to note that the activities of RM have been challenged by the PCC’s senior 
leadership. Cardinal Glemp, Archbishop of Warsaw from 1981-2006 repeatedly tried to reign 
it in but was unsuccessful in part due to ‘widespread support for RM amongst the Polish 
bishops’ (Krzemiński 2017: 93). Only after the intervention of Pope Benedict XVI, in which he 
urged the Catholic media in Poland to ‘respect the autonomy of the political sphere and the 
unity of the episcopate’, was a Policy Board including bishops established to oversee the RM 
group’s activities, but this too has had limited impact (ibid.). 
Still, while the role of RM group has been significant in circulating ultra-nationalist views, 
it is not enough to explain the electoral success of PiS in the 2015 election, when it took 37.6% 
of the national vote, enough to win it a majority of Parliamentary seats, a vote share increased 
to 44% in 2019. Other key factors include successful use of social media to target voters using 
its strongly polarising discourse, which capitalised (in 2015) on anxieties about national 
security (heightened by the Ukraine crisis) and fears around immigration also entwined with 
security, especially from Muslim societies in response to the European ‘migrant crisis’ of 2015 
(despite the low numbers of asylum applicants to Poland - fewer than 150 applicants in 2015, 
Narkowicz 2018, 358).
Another important factor was the promise of more generous social provision, especially 
the Family 500 Plus programme, which offered 500 złoty (c. 120 Euro) per month per child 
to families to support their second and subsequent children. In a country with the highest 
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proportion of people in temporary jobs in Europe (Eurostat 2014), this protection from 
employment precarity proved particularly attractive. 
Analysts also highlight the role of religious voters in supporting the PiS in the 2015 election 
(Marcinkiewicz 2016: 471). Survey data shows that frequent religious participation is strongly 
correlated with voting PiS – 76% of intending PiS voters attended mass once a week or more, 
compared around 40% for major rival political parties (ESS 2014). However, unscrambling 
what this means in terms of the role of religion the PiS victories in 2015 and 2019 is, as indicated 
above, not straightforward. There are differences of opinion amongst Polish Catholics, both 
between an ‘open’ or liberal Catholic press (e.g. Znak, Tygodnik Powszechny and Więź) and the 
nationalist RM media group, and between church leaders keen to align with official teaching 
seeking to restrict the influence of the RM group but hampered by opposition from within 
their own ranks. However, the association of high mass attendance with voting PiS supports 
the analysis of Narkowicz that amongst the laity supporters of:
‘Closed Catholicism’, [which] is the much larger and more influential movement of reactionary 
traditionalist right-wing Catholicism that has more in common with the current government 
(2018: 362)
…outnumbers the supporters of ‘Open Catholicism’ who have ‘historically engaged in critical 
debates with the secular left and still contribute to the public sphere through magazines … that 
resist a reactionary Catholicism in Poland’ (ibid.). 
In the context of this complex dynamic in relation to RWP in the religious field, we turn 
to the impact of RWP mobilisation on other social fields, beginning with religious minorities.
4. Varieties and Dynamics of Antisemitism and Islamophobia in 
Poland
The Polish-language internet is overflowing with hate speech, especially of the anti-Semitic 
variety. (Gerbert 2014: 99) 
The imagined threat of a Muslim terrorist arriving from Syria disguised as a refugee has dominated 
public discourse on refugees in Poland. (Narkowicz 2018: 358) 
Despite the Catholic Church’s official teaching, which recognises the salvific efficacy of 
other religions and calls for dialogue (Nostra Aetate), and despite a unique initiative by the 
Council of Bishops to develop such dialogue in Poland:
the Dzień Islamu (Day of Islam), celebrated for the first time in January 2001. … consists of 
numerous interfaith events (conferences/seminars and interfaith services) is held every year on 
26 January in different parts of the country. (Pędziwiatr 2018: 463)
… public opinion polls show anti-Semitic and Islamophobic attitudes to be widespread 
in Poland, despite the tiny Jewish and Muslim populations. Thus the 2011 census recorded 
7353 self-identified Jews in Poland, with current estimates at around 10,000, while Pędziwiatr 
(2015) estimates the number of Muslims in Poland to be between 25,000 and 40,000. Thus in a 
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population of 38.7 million means each group accounts for around or less than 0.1%. This is in 
stark contrast to public perceptions of the extent of immigration:
The Perils of Perception study carried out in 2016 by Ipsos Mori revealed that Poles believed 
that their country was inhabited by 2.6 million Muslims and that their number would grow to 
represent 13 per cent of the total population (5 million people) by 2020. (Pędziwiatr 2018: 465)
In the context of these wildly distorted perceptions, it is perhaps not surprising that a Pew 
survey in 2016 found 66% of Poles held an unfavourable attitude towards Muslims living in 
the country, the third highest in Europe after Hungary (72%) and Italy (69%), while a survey of 
anti-Semitism found that 64.5% believed moderately or strongly in Jewish conspiracy theories 
(Jews are a threat to economic well-being of Poles), and 22.5% believe moderately or strongly 
in ‘traditional’ antisemitism, where Jews are seen as a threat to Christian religious culture, 
beliefs or values (Bilewicz et al., 2013: 825-8). 
Alongside these widespread negative beliefs and attitudes, reported attacks on the small 
Jewish and Muslim populations are increasing (Bujalski 2016); indeed, the tiny Jewish 
population suffered 98 reported racist attacks in 2012 (Gebert 2014: 97). This is part of rising 
trend in reported hate crime, up from 194 attacks in 2009 to 886 in 2017 (OSCE 2017). This 
situation appears not to have been helped by the PiS government, which dissolved the 
Council Against Racial Discrimination and Xenophobia (the sole government body working 
against hate crime) and arguably legitimises the far right presence in civil society both by its 
polarising discourse and active measures such as removing sections on far-right ideology from 
educational material on hate crimes for police forces (Pedziwiatr 2017; Narkowicz 2018: 388). 
While Polish anti-Semitism has medieval roots and a continuous history, manifest after the 
Second World War in government supported pogroms legitimised by ‘modern antisemitism’ 
in the post war period (1948, and as late as 1968), Islamophobia beyond a more generalised 
Orientalism (assumption of European cultural superiority) appears to be a more recent 
phenomenon. Clearly, anxieties around terrorism are prominent, as elsewhere (Narkowicz 
2018: 358), but cultural resistance to a Muslim presence may be shaped by different factors to 
those operating in Western Europe. For example, Narkowicz and Pedziwiatr (2017) argue that 
mosque building was regarded as ‘largely unproblematic before the Second World War and 
during the Communist era’; only recent construction in Warsaw has sparked intense public 
controversy revealeding ‘unprecedented opposition’(ibid.: 441). 
In understanding this development Narkowicz and Pedziwiatr (2017) caution against 
assuming that Islamophobia in Poland will follow a similar trajectory to that in Western 
Europe, pointing to different historical experiences: 
Muslims were not primary (ex) colonial subjects and had different class positions; from the Tatars 
who were highly regarded in the Polish army to the students from befriended socialist Arab 
countries during Communism (ibid. 454)
However, they concede that Western European Islamophobic discourses had influenced the 
rhetoric of their interviewees, local people who had objected to the construction of the Warsaw 
mosques, for example when they:
applied ‘gender exceptionalism’ through identifying themselves with a largely imagined gender 
equal national community – Western Europe – in order to be able to mark Islam and Muslims of 
discrimination of women. (ibid.: 454)
Yet they argue that Polish Islamophobia differs from Western European forms in being 
more rooted in religion, particularly when mobilising around common ‘Christian’ principles 
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in order to prevent ‘Islamisation of Poland and Europe’ (ibid., 455). However, while not 
assuming the primacy of Western European patterns is doubtless a correct starting point, this 
point is questionable; the rhetoric of the Islamisation of Europe echoes PEGIDA and other 
far right groups active in Central and Western Europe. While there are Western European 
Islamophobic discourses which do not depend on the defence of Christian people/culture (the 
discourse of Pim Fortuyn and his successors in the Netherlands for example, which draw on 
a defence of secular and Enlightenment principles in order to combine Islamophobia with a 
pro-gay stance; Herbert 2013: 47), the defence of Christian people/culture is often invoked 
in Islamophobic discourses Western Europe. This is so even in Scandinavia where regular 
religious participation is minimal, occurring because ethnic boundaries are still bound up 
with religious identification. For example, in Denmark conversion to Islam is regularly seen as 
crossing an ethnic boundary (Herbert and Hansen 2018). 
Furthermore, other sources argue that ‘liberal Islamophobic’ discourses are also found in 
Poland, alongside the ‘nationalist Islamophobic’, as in Western Europe. Thus Bobako (2018) 
distinguishes between a ‘liberal Islamophobia’ which is:
[I]s a way to confirm symbolically Poland’s belonging to ‘the West’ and its commitment to the 
normative project of European modernity, with its affirmation of individualism, human rights, 
sexual freedom and secularism (ibid., 448)
…and ‘the Islamophobia of the resurgent nationalist forces in Poland [which] is … the 
outcome of a rejection of this very project, which is perceived as a threat to national political 
sovereignty and cultural autonomy’ (ibid.). Indeed, by appealing the defence of both gender 
equality and Christian values in their discourse, Narkowicz and Pedziwiatr’s interviewees also 
arguably draw on both. This is not to argue that the balance of appeal to these discourses is even 
between Poland and, say, the Netherlands – it certainly is not, with the Christian nationalist 
discourse having stronger appeal in Poland – but rather that both discourses operate in both 
contexts, depending on the shifting dynamics of ‘Othering’ – ‘secular’ Western Europe is on 
the one hand ‘other’ in relation to Poland’s Catholic nationalist identity, but ‘like’ in relation 
to Islam and Muslims. 
5. Homophobia and Right Wing Populism in Poland
Illiberalism toward sexual minorities has deep roots in many of the new member-states. 
Communism was deeply conservative culturally, encasing traditional, recently peasant-based 
social practices in ‘neo-Victorianism’ (O’Dwyer and Schwartz 2010: 221) 
These are ordinary, thoroughly ordinary people: nice Mr Kowalski from the allotments, Mr 
Nowak who goes to the local shop, Mr Wolski from No 6. But with masks instead of their usual 
faces, which are altered in a nightmarish way, their eyes full of blood, their voices raucous, yelling, 
“fuck, arse, faggots”. The fact that those rosaries, those crosses, those icons of Jesus they’re holding 
up are soiled with filth, interlaced with the ugliest words of all, with linguistic excrement, is an 
act of blasphemy no Polish bishop will ever condemn. (Dehnel 2019, reporting from the first Pride 
march in Białystok, July 2019)
Regional party [PiS] officials have … pushed to declare cities and even entire provinces in the 
country’s conservative southeast “LGBT-ideology free”. Activists have counted around 30 such 
declarations so far. (Noack 2019)
A 2013 report found that 63 percent of LGBT people in Poland agree with the statement 
that discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation [is] widespread. (Gebert 2014: 98). 
Homosexual activity is legal in Poland and LGB people may serve in the military, but LG 
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marriage and civil partnerships are not recognised, no specific category of homophobic hate 
crime exists in law, and homophobic hate speech is not a criminal offence (Godzisz and Knut 
2018). Like other parts of former communist Central and Eastern Europe, Poland inherited 
socially conservative norms from the Communist period, reinforced by the strong traditionalist 
elements in the PCC. 
The pre-and post EU accession periods saw great optimism amongst LGBT activists, with 
the first Pride parades organised, but already by 2005 (the first PiS (coalition) government 
was 2005-7) attempts were made to ban the marches and opposition demonstrations officially 
encouraged (O’Dwyer and Schwartz 2010: 220-1). Official PCC rhetoric has largely resonated 
with that of the government and right-wing press:
The Polish Bishops’ Conference calls non-heterosexual arrangements “completely alien to 
European civilisation”. During Easter mass, the Metropolitan Archbishop of Gdansk condemned 
the “idol of tolerance”. An “LGBT dictatorship” is approaching, warned a recent cover of Do 
Rzeczy, a right-wing weekly (The Economist 2 May 2019) 
In the case of the 2019 Białystok Pride parade from which a participant’s testimony was quoted 
above, the event was held in defiance of Archbishop Tadeusz Wojda’s explicit condemnation of 
the event. The second PiS period of government has seen further intensification of government 
led homophobic rhetoric, with a particular escalation in the run up to European Parliamentary 
elections in May 2019. PiS officials deployed the tactic of encouraging cities and provincial 
authorities to declare ‘LGBT ideology-free zones’. While such ‘zones’ would have no legal 
status, the intent of curtailing the public display of difference is clear.
6. Visibility, Othering and Agency
The rhetoric used to mobilise against a public LGBT presence is worthy of further 
comment, because it is positioned as not only ‘anti-family’ – even paedophile (Reuters, 2019) 
- with proposals to improve school education about sexual diversity described not only as an 
‘attack on children’- but also as ‘foreign’, despite the evidently ethnic composition of Polish 
Pride parade participants. Situating LGBT discourse a ‘foreign ideology’ reflects a broader 
positioning of feminist and equalities discourses as alien ‘gender ideologies’ imported from 
the West, a discursive position that arguably blends Polish nationalism with Communist anti-
Western discourse, situating them as imperialist and aggressive attacks on Polish independence 
and cultural autonomy. Visible Polish LGBT citizens seem to be experienced by the users of 
such language as an unwelcome intrusion, an attack on the established social order. 
The terms used suggest a dynamic strikingly similar to reactions to the visible signs of 
Islam – manifest in mosque construction and the wearing of hijab - in cities in Western Europe. 
As Gőle 2012 observes:
temporary and hidden mosques without a distinctive, recognizable feature in suburban industrial 
zones, … do not stir public unrest. It is … visual religious and cultural difference in the city 
centers, and the awakening piousness of Muslims that provoke public controversies around 
mosques across Europe (Göle 2012: 383)
In Gőle ‘s account, ‘the ‘visibility’ of Islam in public is conceptualized as a form of agency … 
a manifestation of religious difference that cannot be thought independent of the materiality 
of culture, namely aesthetic forms, dress codes, or architectural genres’. In the same way, it 
is the visibility of LGBT identity in Poland’s city centres, and the materiality of Pride, that 
seems to elicit the strongest reactions. It is by coming out of the closet dressed differently that 
LGBT activists and Muslims seem to most challenge nativist constructions of social order. 
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Thus, by conceptualising ‘the ‘visibility’ of Islam in public as ‘a form of agency’ Göle provides 
a framework for making sense of antagonistic reactions to novel claims to public presence, 
whether by French Muslims or Polish LGBT rights activists. For in the claiming the right to 
be openly present and seen they render visible the exclusive basis of the existing social order, 
and hence call for its renegotiation - though via a call rooted in a struggle for recognition and 
equality rather than domination, as the far right reading suggests.
In electoral terms, however, PiS tactic appears to have been successful, with the party 
strengthening its position in the European Parliament, increasing its seats from 19/51 to 27/52, 
a majority of seats for the first time. However, by espousing such a divisive rhetoric the PiS 
has also appears to be galvanising opposition forces. In February 2019 Warsaw’s mayor Rafal 
Trzaskowski signed a declaration in favour of lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) 
rights signed by, Warsaw’s newly elected liberal mayor, with proposals including ‘a shelter in 
Warsaw, anti-discrimination measures and more sex education in schools’, with the Poland’s 
Ombudsman for Human Rights calling for other cities to follow suit (The Economist, 2019). A 
new left wing party, Wiosna (Spring), led by a former mayor and campaigning on a platform 
which included legalising gay marriage, took 6% of the vote in European elections. And mass 
protests have been organised against measures initially supported by PiS to tighten Poland’s 
already strict abortion laws still further. 
7. Abortion Rights and the Development of Opposition Networks 
Prorefugee, anti-racist, feminist, left-wing and LGBTQ groups have joined together in various 
initiatives in recent years in what has become a resistance to what is perceived as a climate of hate 
towards not only ethnic and religious minorities, but to all forms of Otherness (Narkowicz 2018: 
369)
One such major galvanising issue in recent years has been the proposal to further tighten 
Poland’s already strict abortion laws to ban abortion in almost all circumstances. Despite a 
total ban only being supported by 7% of the population, the Parliamentary arithmetic after 
the 2015 landslide for the PiS meant that with government backing a proposal by the private 
Catholic foundation the Ordo Iuris Institute could have become law. This set the scene for one 
of the most remarkable confrontations in recent Polish history:
On October 3, 2016, cities across Poland were seized by massive demonstrations against new 
proposals for a total abortion ban in the country. These proposals, first drafted by the Ordo Iuris 
Institute, a reactionary Catholic foundation, were designed to deny all access to abortion, with 
no exceptions. The conservative government of the Law and Justice party (PiS), along with 
the Roman Catholic Church, fully supported the idea. But the women’s rights movement that 
spontaneously emerged in opposition forced ruling-party members in Parliament to abandon the 
project (Szelegieniec 2018: 45).
This victory of the ‘Black Friday Protests’ — so-called because of the dark clothes worn 
by many protesters — was particularly remarkable given the relative weakness of feminist 
and women’s rights movements in Poland since the 1990s (Hall 2019). The movement was 
enabled by mobilisation on social media platforms and involved significant participation 
from nonreligious activists. While not explicitly targeted by far right activists in the way 
that religious and LGBT minorities are, nonreligious – those who profess that they have no 
religious belief and reject identification with any religious groups – are a growing minority in 
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Poland (16% of aged 16-29, SOURCE), and evidence1 suggests this group also feel increasingly 
marginalised in the nationalist Catholic public environment promoted by the PiS and other far 
right groups. For example, ‘Monika’, a 26-year-old woman from Warsaw comments:
Well, now the church is getting more and more involved with politics... Recently there were some 
huge protests about the abortion ban, the church wanted politicians to pass this law. There were 
some huge protests around here, so, I mean, if this would pass, that would affect my life a lot, like 
other people in Poland. It could mean that church would say, “Well, we can now do anything. If 
we can make politicians pass the law we want”, then it would start to affect my life a lot.
Monika’s nonreligious identity became highlighted and potentially politicised when it is 
confronted by challenges which she experiences as intruding on her personal choices. Polling 
data suggests Monika’s stance on this issue is typical of young nonreligious; data from 2016 
shows that nonreligious have amongst the highest support for pro-choice positions in the 
abortion debate in Poland:
support for abortion was strongest among groups with left-wing political sympathies (73 percent 
to 91 percent) and the non-religious (81 percent to 94 percent) (Szelegieniec 2018: 50)
Furthermore, the support carried through into strong support for the Black Protests:
In general, 58 percent of Poles said they supported the protests, while 26 percent opposed them. 
Politically, the strongest support came from people who identified as left-wing (76 percent) and 
nonreligious (78 percent) (ibid. 55)
Furthermore, some nonreligious had prominent leadership roles within the Black Protest 
movement. Basia (early 30s, from Wrocław) for example, helped to organise both the Black 
Protests and the Women’s Strike that followed in 2017. Indeed, it was in the context of 
organising for the Black Protests that Basia developed a sense that a stronger voice was needed 
for people who wanted to opt out of church control, so she developed a Facebook group to 
support people going through the socially challenging and bureaucratic apostasy process:
What I realised during the Black Protests is that there’s a group of people in Poland who need a 
speaker, who need somebody to speak their mind, to say we are against this and that and we can 
break our contract with the church.
Basia argues that the abortion issue in particular is radicalising the anticlerical aspect of the 
Polish opposition:
Step by step and slowly, it’s turned to the last focus on the abortion thing, because the topic is 
returning on and on, because once it is stopped, then the government tries again, because they are 
full of religious fanatics, and they are supported very strongly by the religious politics, and they 
give them money openly as well, which also makes the people ... I mean, the opposition is getting 
more and more anticlerical. 
The election of the majority PiS government from 2015, the sharp right turn in Polish 
politics, and the weakness of centre-left has galvanised new inclusive opposition movements 
in Poland. In part, these have built on earlier networks and organisations. In the case of the 
nonreligious, these developed in the wake of the first PiS led administration (2005-7); inspired 
by the ‘Out Campaign’ for atheists to publicly declare their position led by British God Delusion 
1 Evidence in this section is drawn from interviews conducted by a project led by the author from 2018-2019. 
‘Reaching for a new sense of connection? Towards a deeper understanding of the sociality of generation Y 
non-believers in northern and central Europe’ The project was made possible through a grant from the John 
Templeton Foundation (JTF grant ID#60624) based at the University of Kent. Josh Bullock conducted the 
interviews on the project. Twelve interviews were carried out in locations across Poland as part of the project.
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author Richard Dawkins, List of Internet Atheists and Agnostics was established in 2007, followed 
by Internet Photo Atheists in 2009. 
In response to the 2012 formation of a Parliamentary Group for Prevention of Atheism in Poland 
actions were launched by the Polish Association of Rationalists in 2012 under the slogan ‘If you 
don’t believe you are not alone’. This was followed in 2013 by an Atheists’ March in Warsaw, 
which commemorated the ‘martyrdom’ of the ‘first Polish Atheist’ Kazimierz Łyszczyński in 
1689. Subsequently, an annual event nominating and celebrating the ‘Biggest Atheist in Poland’ 
recognising individuals, organisations and institutions for counteraction against discrimination 
based on belief has been held as well as “atheist picnics” (Bullock and Bullivant, forthcoming). 
While not directly combatting the influence of the far right, such groups provide networks 
which enable mobilisation when the government threatens to further exclude minorities from 
the public sphere, or further erode their rights or the rights of women.
8. Conclusion 
This article we have sought to address four research questions. First, what is the influence 
and effect of right-wing populism across key social fields in Polish society, especially on the 
rights and lives of immigrants, religious minorities, and LGBT groups? While right wing 
populism has been a phenomenon in Polish society over a long period, right wing groups 
have been empowered by the election of the PiS in 2005-7, and further so since 2015. This has 
highlighted the vulnerability of minority groups, who have experienced increased intimidation 
as standards of civility in the public sphere have declined following the example of politicians, 
and physical attacks have become more frequent. While official Catholic teaching is clear on the 
need to extend hospitality to refugees this has been undermined by populist mobilisations of 
religion by multiple media sources, and while some elements of open Catholicism, especially 
in the press, have challenged these developments, other leaders and elements in popular 
Catholicism have supported and fed them. 
What, then, is the role of religion in these struggles from an analytic standpoint? In 
particular, is the PCC (‘institutional religion’) complicit in the growth of RWP’s influence and 
its’ othering practices, or is RWP mobilisation more the result of ‘discursive religion’ operating 
in the public sphere beyond church control, disseminated by religiously self-identified para-
church groups or media outlets, like the RM group, Fronda.pl or Polonia Christiana? On issues 
where official Catholic teaching is unequivocally contrary to a radical right position, like 
hospitality to refugees or interfaith relations, the picture seems to be one of church leaders 
struggling to bring institutions like RM under control - but being undermined by support 
from other quarters within the episcopate. On gender equality and sexuality issues where 
official teaching is socially conservative, and the Bishops’ Council statements tend towards the 
conservative end of interpreting this teaching, there is less of a check on radical right populist 
appropriation of religion. 
In their insightful analysis of the discourse of the Polish bishops on gender issues, Szwed 
and Zieleńska argue that rather than seeing issues such as reproduction, violence against 
women, IVF, abortion and gay sexuality as part of the private sphere of individual rights:
[T]hese issues are treated by religious actors as a matter of public or national concern. Therefore, 
in the Church’s discourse, the rights of the family or community (i.e. nation) to thrive and survive 
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gain priority over the individual rights of women (e.g. to decide about their health and body) and 
men (e.g. to have protection in their private life in the case of gay men). (2017: 126) 
In these social fields then, there is a closer alignment between right wing populist 
construction of a homogenous nation and a conservative interpretation of Catholic teaching, 
and hence, more of an enabling role of the PCC in the growing influence of RWP in these fields.
Third, what has caused the increase in right wing religious populism across these social 
fields in Poland? We have reviewed a range of possible causes, from Poland’s history of division 
and occupation making frames of heroic national martyrdom and international victimisation 
particularly resonant, through to job insecurity for many in the population. Drawing on Göle’s 
theory of visibility as agency, it may be suggested that in this context of insecurity changes in 
the public sphere (such as the construction of mosques and the advent of Pride parades) may 
be experienced as cultural ‘invasions’ which make it easier to activate these national frames. 
Certainly, the role of the internet and social media, where for example 86% (compared to 55% 
for Catholic magazines and newspapers) of the sample in one national survey say they obtain 
their information on Islam and Muslims, is also a significant enabling factor (Pędziwiatr 2018: 
471). 
Finally, opposition groups have responded with increased co-operation across a range of 
issues thorough common interest groups, achieving success in the case of resisting proposals 
for further restrictions on abortion. We have also observed pragmatic responses at city level, 
for example to immigration, which suggest the possibility of developing and implementing 
progressive policies despite the position of the national government, in a development that 
parallels the deepening of multicultural and equalities practices in diverse cities in the UK in 
the 1980s and 1990s despite a right wing government; however, such disparities in national 
practice risk reinforcing existing divisions and polarisation. The future is therefore uncertain, 
with opposition groups increasingly networked and organised to resist further shifts right and 
long term demographics favouring the decline of Catholic nationalism; but it is difficult to see 
how escalating cultural conflict can be avoided in the medium term. 
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